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Still Life, A Mirror:  
Phasic memory and re-encounters with artworks 
 
Re-encountering certain kinds of artworks in the present (re-listening to music, re-reading novels) can often occasion 
a kind of recollection akin to episodic recollection, but which may be better cast as ‘phasic’, at least insofar as one can 
be said to remember ‘what it was like’ to be oneself at some earlier stage or phase in one’s personal history. The kinds 
of works that prompt such recollection, I call ‘still lives’ - they are limited wholes whose formal properties are stable 
over time. In the first part of the paper, I spell out a way of making sense of the peculiar power that certain artworks 
have to occasion such recollection – it is, as I explain, a power or ductus that derives from the form of the artwork, 
though possession of such a power is not limited to art. I then detail three dimensions along which episodic 
recollection and phasic recollection as occasioned by re-encountering ‘still lives’ differ: metaphysical, 
phenomenological, and descriptive. In the second half, I explore a challenge for my account of phasic recollection, 
which in turn helps make more vivid my proposal as well as the spectral analogy at the heart of it: Just as one can see 
regions behind one by looking in the direction of a mirror located in the same space in which one is, sometimes by 
re-encountering certain kinds of artworks now, past intervals or phases ‘behind one’ can be ‘made present’ in a way 
that the paper aims to make plain. I also explain to what extent phasic recollection might be understood as a form of 
mental time travel, and what the attendant phenomenology of ‘transportation’ involves. 
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       To speak of my offices / I undertake to sort the 
       essentials, / the diverse, simple things, / into an 
       integrated work .... /And there I arrange my  
       ornaments / my flowers, my colours, my green 
       lawns / in order to attain by hard labours / the 
       goal encompassed in my intention 
 
§1 The Datum  
  
When Marcel tastes a tea-soaked madeleine, the town of Combray springs into being from his 
teacup; a region of space is recollected. The story of the madeleine is often treated as a case of 
involuntary recollection occasioned by a sensory object or cue, but Proust also mentions a 
related experiential phenomenon: the recollection of an interval or phase of time on recountering 
an artwork. 
 
And before Swann had time to understand what was happening, to think: “It is the little 
phrase from Vinteuil's sonata. I mustn’t listen!”, all his memories of the days when Odette 
had been in love with him, which he had succeeded, up till that evening, in keeping invisible 
in the depths of his being, deceived by this sudden reflection of a season of love, whose sun, 
they supposed, had dawned again, had awakened from their slumber, had taken wing and 
risen to sing maddeningly in his ears (Marcel Proust (1913/1956), Swann's Way, p. 496) 
I defend two thoughts in relation to this phenomenon – one negative and one positive.  
 
Negatively, I suggest that some memories occasioned by re-encountering artworks are not best 
cast as episodic. Nelson (1993, p.7) tells us that “an episodic memory has the phenomenal 
characteristic of referring to something that happened once at a specific time and place”. For 
Conway (2008, p.19), episodic memories are “specific moment-fragments”. Robins (2017, p.77) 
has it that they are “for one-off experiences”. But Odette loved Swann for weeks; what is 
recalled is a season of love. I will suggest that sometimes re-encounters with artworks occasion 
what I will call phasic memory – that is, they involve the recollection of past phases in one’s 
personal history.  
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Positively, I propose that phasic recollection as occasioned by re-encounters with artworks 
depends on the perceiver’s being perceptually related to a formal object, the form and nature of 
which is partly constitutive of the recollection, as well as partly explanatory of our capacity to 
notice our undergoing any such episodes. What is meant by “constitution” is something to be 
spelt out later on (and incompletely). I get at the idea roughly by way of my peculiar title which is 
intended to invite a loose analogy with perception with a mirror: 
 
When looking at a mirror in the same space in which one is located, regions behind one can be 
seen. In this respect, location and direction are cleaved apart; things located behind one can be 
seen by looking in the direction of the mirror and one’s spatial perspective is augmented.1 
Analogously, sometimes on re-encountering artworks, past phases in one’s personal history can 
become ‘present’ to one again; there is a sense in which they overlay and thus come to augment 
the present. However, as I propose, this mode of augmentation is not best cast as a form of 
mental time travel, at least if by that it is assumed that the same kinds of mental events and 
occurrences are involved in such recollection as are involved in imagining the future or 
counterfactual possibility, a thought that has been recently cast as metaphysical continuism, 
imagination and memory being supposed continuous in mental kind (See Michaelian et al, 
forthcoming and Michaelian 2016). Rather, because episodes of phasic recollection as occasioned 
by re-encounters with artworks depend on the presence of the artwork, the experience that such 
recollection involves could not be of the same kind as the experience that underlies mere 
imagining of the future (say). At the same time, insofar as what is sometimes occasioned when 
one undergoes phasic recollection is, as I will show, a way of occupying and relating to the space 
one currently occupies - albeit in a way that is characteristic of a past phase of one’s personal history 
- such recollection can nonetheless serve to orient future action and movement in actual, non-
imagined space and across time. To this extent, phasic recollection can involve a certain sort of 
Janus-headed temporal orientation, though it needn’t always. 
 
The paper unfolds as follows. First, I set a constraint on which artworks can be re-encountered 
and in virtue of what they are re-encounterable. I introduce a concept now mostly lost in 
contemporary discussion: the medieval notion of ductus. I explain in what sense the ductus of a 
work is or can be conceived of as a kind of power to conduct patterns of perception, thought, 
imagination, and feeling. In §2, I defend the negative claim by distinguishing episodic and phasic 
memory along three dimensions: roughly, metaphysical, phenomenological, and descriptive. I 
develop the positive claim in §3 by canvassing  a candidate objection and in §4 I sketch the 
peculiar ontology of experience that the title of the paper hints at. I close by saying something 
about the phenomenology of transportation that such experiences involve. 
§1. Still Life 
 
I will assume that at least some artworks can be re-encountered - that one can re-listen to a song, 
re-read the same novel. This is not to endorse a so-called ‘lump’ view of the ontology of 
artworks however, one that identifies artworks with material objects. Instead I pick up, as 
something like a constraint, a thought from Iris Murdoch. Murdoch writes that if I stand in front 
of a painting, and “nothing happens” then “something has gone wrong” (1992, p.3). I think we 
can acknowledge both this obscure reality and the thought that, in the main, most works of art, 
irrespective of medium or genre, require material objects and processes to keep them, as 
Murdoch puts it, ‘continuously available’. That we can re-encounter such material objects and 
processes ensures that we can also re-encounter the artworks that they, by various means, as she 
puts it, ‘body forth’ (1992, p.2).  
                                                     
1 See Steenhagen (2017) for discussion. 
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In broad strokes, I will assume that what is re-encountered is some kind of stable structure or 
form which is such that it can be ‘bodied forth’ through space and time. Many artworks are 
special in this sense. For instance, their size or shape (pictures), their ontology (musical works, 
novels) and, importantly, their normative status (we don’t typically tamper with artworks – for 
example., we don’t as a matter of course reuse the material that makes them available) - ensures 
that they can easily move through space and time, or be realised in different spaces and times, 
mostly without loss. While the world around them changes, they do not. Accordingly, I will call 
such works ‘still lives’. Still lives have a stable identity. 
 
Yet that still lives have a stable identity does not mean that they are essentially unchanging. 
Some ‘still lives’ maintain their identity over time despite change; if, for instance, time is part of 
the content of the work, or if the material that ‘bodies forth the work’ is not merely material but 
vital, as in a garden. It follows that works that are time-specific are not ‘still lives’ in the sense I 
am envisaging - for example, highly ephemeral landart or works such as Roman Singer’s time-
structures are not ‘still lives’. Such works cannot be re-encountered at a distant later time because 
while their form may have been stable at a time, it did not persist over and through time.2 
 
I focus entirely on artworks that are ‘still lives’, though I consider that phasic memory on re-
encountering stable form or structure is also occasioned by many other stable forms that were 
repetitively engaged with at a distant interval in one’s past personal history – for instance, the 
childhood home, places that one used to frequent as a teenager, perhaps even a well-known 
forest at a certain time of year. One reason for this limited focus is that artworks, because of 
their normative status, are more likely to survive with their form in-tact (literally: not-touched). 
Likewise, those that are not site-specific can be moved through space, which makes re-
encountering them not only at a different time but place possible. 
 
A second reason for this limitation arises from the way in which we tend to approach art. We 
approach it, as the Kantian aesthetician might put it, disinterestedly.3 This doesn’t mean that we 
ought not to approach art inquisitively or even without interest or worse inattentively, the word 
‘disinterested’ notwithstanding. It means only that when one contemplates an artwork as an 
artwork this partly involves treating it and one’s experience of it non-instrumentally. This might 
be easily disputed. Perhaps a teenager might feign musical tastes that are apt to make him seem 
‘cool’ to his peers. However the idea I am after is closer to an idea that is nicely expressed by 
Lucy O’Brien. Artworks afford what she describes as “practical rest” (2017, p.149). We don’t 
typically act on them or with them. And that we approach them thus disinterestedly, not using 
them instrumentally, not acting on or with them, means that we are more apt to notice the effect 
they have on us. Further, that artworks are designed to be contemplated and to reward attention 
means that the possibility of our becoming aware of our being thus affected is amplified – and 
can sometimes even be savoured.  
 
My focus on artwork is heuristic then. I think the phenomenon of phasic memory is more easily 
described by appeal to art and perhaps, for the same reasons, is most familiar in the context of 
such re-encounters. However, I also think that peculiar ontology and metaphysics of phasic 
memory is best brought into view by these cases – and I hope the paper is proof of that. It 
                                                     
2 There are many related issues here I do not discuss. Some works are not intended to be time-specific though they 
are intended to be ephemeral. Others happen to be ephemeral because of the materials out of which they are made. 
I don’t discuss alternative views of the identity of Art (e.g. Adorno’s view that the identity of artwork itself changes 
over time). Nor do I discuss the timelessness of great Art.  
3 The emphasis here is on Kantian, not Kant. Kant himself distinguishes between judgments of free and dependent 
beauty – crucially, the latter, which apply to fine art, are not disinterested.  
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strikes me that only once this is in sight can questions concerning the normative status of the 
occasioning structure be fruitfully framed. For instance, if episodes of phasic recollection are 
valuable – and they may be so for many reasons that I don’t even broach – a perceiver that does 
not, or cannot, re-encounter stable forms, including ‘still lives’, is missing out in various respects. 
Questions concerning elitism, aesthetic injustice, cultural appropriation and memorialisation are 
nearby here, but I do not bring my discussion into conversation with any of these themes.  
 
What then is special about form and, given my heuristic, artistic form in particular? I will assume 
that ‘still lives’ possess a certain power in virtue of their form, which I illuminate or at least 
articulate by appeal to a medieval conception of form, now lost or forgotten: the notion of a 
work’s having a ductus. I don’t defend this notion – in fact, it is only a placeholder for the kind of 
conception of form that the argument requires. Nonetheless, appeal to ductus will allow me to 
capture why works that have a ductus (or some such quality) are apt to support phasic recollection 
when re-encountered. Here I assume that the relevant artworks were previously repetitively 
engaged with over some remote interval before being retired, how remote being, I take it, an 
empirical matter.  
 
So, what is the ductus of a work? Revisit the epigraph at the start of this essay, which comes from 
a French courtly treatise on rhetoric called Les Douze Dames de Rhétorique. Twelve rhetorical 
procedures are represented by distinct handmaids. The words quoted are spoken the eleventh, 
Deduccion loable or ‘praiseworthy planning’, who represents arrangement, or the ductus of a work. 
Medievalist Mary Carruthers glosses this as follows. The ductus of a work is: 
 
“the way by which a work leads someone through itself: that quality in a work’s formal 
patterns which engages an audience and then sets a viewer or auditor or performer in 
motion within its structures” (my emphasis, 2009, p.190).  
Etymologically, ductus was used as the past participle of ducere - ‘led’. In its nominal form, it 
means way or path, a directed movement or course, and names “a principle of movement not 
stasis, of process rather than product, the conduct of a thinking, listening and feeling mind on its 
way through a composition” (ibid., p.206).  
One might wonder what the role of the artist is, on this conception. Carruthers explains: For 
Cicero, the consilium of the work is “the aggregate of the rational decisions and selections of the 
composer as s/he works” (De invention I.25.36, see Carruthers p.200). Consultus Fortunatianus 
has it that while “the consilium is a matter of [the author’s] choice, ductus is part of the work itself. 
Likewise, in that the ductus develops from the consilium, not the consilium from the ductus” (Ars rhet. 
I.8 (75.19-21). The ductus then is intrinsic to the work itself, even while it is relational insofar as it 
is a capacity to engage the viewer or auditor, to “set them in motion”. It is intentionally 
produced.  
I have implicitly cast the ductus of a work as a power. Powers can be characterized in terms of 
dispositions; for instance, it might be thought to be in the essence of a power to be disposed to 
bring about a certain effect without being identified with those dispositions (Groff 2017). When 
I use the notion of a power I mean it to encompass the looser and more intuitive notion of a 
disposition as a capacity or ability (Mumford 2009). Dispositions can be conceived as grounded 
or ungrounded. If certain disposition kinds are necessarily grounded, they are non-fundamental. 
I take it that the power of an artwork to ‘lead’ is uncontroversially non-fundamental. I suppose 
that the ductus of a work is at least partially grounded in its form and that this form must be at 
least perceptually accessible (Petit 1983). For instance, while novels are not perceived, their form is 
perceptually accessible. They need to be read or listened to. Many artforms involve sensuous 
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perceptible form, but the ductus that a work possesses in virtue of its form need not be exhausted 
by perceptible form. 
Of course, a great deal needs to be said about what ductus is or could be. For the purposes of this 
paper I have introduced the idea with only a high level of generality. What matters for now is the 
simple idea that certain artworks possess an ability to conduct patterns of perception, 
imagination, feeling and thought, partly in virtue of their form, form which must be perceptually 
accessible (if not constituted by sensible form as many artworks are). This helps articulate less 
opaquely I think what I call Murdoch’s Constraint is getting at. If one stands in front of a painting 
(say), and nothing happens – that is, you are not led anywhere, perceptually, emotionally, 
cognitively, or imaginatively by the work – then it is intelligible to say that something has gone 
wrong. Of course, something can be wrong with you – you may be distracted, tired, perhaps you 
can’t make out what the work is about because your hermeneutic resources are not up to the 
task, or perhaps you are confronting the object at the wrong moment in history. But likely too 
something may be wrong with the work. Put simple, it may lack the relevant power or capacity 
to lead. 
Importantly, this does not mean that works that do lead, that do possess a ductus, typically 
reproduce those patterns when re-encountered – viz. that they lead the perceiver in the same way 
on each occasion. Rather, that certain artworks possess a power or ductus in virtue of perceptually 
accessible form is compatible with the idea that there are countless ways to ‘move through’ a 
given work or to be ‘set in motion’ by its structures. Indeed, the ductus of the good artwork will 
typically have a kind of inexhaustibility which explains, in part, why one returns to it again and 
again. But not only that. Many artworks are composed not only to repay aesthetic attention, and 
so to sustain interest over some present interval but also to be re-encountered at a later time and 
so to be re-encounterable. And this too often shows up in the ductus and is a consideration which 
surely shapes the consilium, likely often tacitly. For instance, the great modernist composer 
Schoenberg, though supposing repetition crucial to the intelligibility of music, nonetheless 
reduced the amount of repetition in his work in light of the anticipated innovation that would 
mean that his work could be recorded and re-listened to. It is a familiar phenomenon that some 
music, when listened to ‘on repeat’, will soon, to borrow Hume’s delicate phrasing, “pall the 
taste”4.  
In what follows I propose that only works that have a ductus can sustain phasic recollection. This 
explains why works that are designed to be re-encountered or repetitively engaged with are apt to 
induce it. Earlier I designated such works as ‘still lives’, mostly to highlight the fact that they tend 
to travel through space and time in-tact, partly due to their normative status. I can now make 
that notion more precise: 
DEF ‘Still Life’:  
A work of art, the formal features of which are stable over time, such that the same work can 
be re-encountered at a later time, where those stable features – which compromise its form - 
partly ground the ductus of the work and are at least perceptually accessible. 
 
Two caveats.  
 
                                                     
4 The relationship between enjoyment, or musical pleasure, and exposure is non-linear. As Hume comments in the 
Of Standard of Taste “there is a species of beauty, which, as it is florid and superficial, pleases at first; but being found 
incompatible with a just expression either of reason or passion, soon palls upon the taste, and is then rejected with 
disdain, at least rated at a much lower value” (1910, p. 227) 
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Though I distinguish episodic memory from the kind of phasic recollection that I claim re-
encountering artworks can sometimes occasion, I do not explore the relation between episodes 
and phases. It is likely that certain events do serve to demarcate phases and can stand as 
temporal landmarks in one’s personal history –  cultural rites of passage and other personally 
temporally significant events like one’s first kiss.5 
 
Second, that re-encounters with such artefacts can occasion phasic recollection does not yet 
mean that other structures do not - they can, though I think we are much less apt to notice 
them.6 Nor does it mean that phasic memory does not also involve canonically episodic 
memories; it often does. Proust tells us that when Swann hears the violin rise to a series of high 
notes, he  ‘sees’ again “the snowy, curled petals of the chrysanthemum which [Odette] had 
tossed after him into his carriage….” – this is a one-off temporal fragment, a recollected episode. 
But Swann remembers too “all the network of mental habits, of seasonable impressions, of 
sensory reactions, which had extended over a series of weeks its uniform meshes, by which his 
body now found itself inextricably held” (Proust (1913/1956), Swann's Way, p. 496). Swann 
recalls a season of love which Vinteuil’s sonata reflects. Later, I will explain why this latter italicized 
term is itself strangely reflective of the ontology and metaphysics of those phasic recollections 
that are occasioned by re-encountering ‘still lives’. 
 
 
§2. Episodic versus phasic memories 
 
Here I set out three considerations in favour of the negative claim - the idea that the memories 
occasioned by re-encountering artworks are often not standardly episodic but phasic. My method 
is to draw on fragments of testimony and descriptive phenomenology to buoy up my analysis, 
which I later draw together through the spectral analogy I make explicit in closing. I also make 
plain the respects in which phasic memory as occasioned by re-encounters with artworks both 
does and does not involve ‘mental time travel’. 
 
1. The artwork is present 
 
To begin, we might remark that in phasic recollection as occasioned by re-encounters with 
artworks, the artwork is present; what is salient is that the work previously engaged with is here 
now. In her wonderful The Garden as an Art, Mara Miller uses the striking idiom of being ‘face-to-
face’ with something:  
 
“The work of art reveals itself to me….in encountering such a structure, which remains 
substantially identical with itself over time, I encounter myself. I come face to face with 
memories of myself as I was, and as I felt, in previous encounters. The sameness of the 
structure prompts recognition of the difference in the viewer. This is inevitably part of 
the experience of a work of art” (1993, p.112) 
 
The descriptive phenomenology that Miller offers in this passage might seem to invite an episodic 
reading. Even so, a key feature of her description marks off the mode of recollection that she 
describes from standard forms of episodic recollection. Her recollective experience depends on 
the temporal presence of the artwork – she is in the garden, now. Yet, as Matthew Soteriou 
notes: 
                                                     
5 For an account of the boundaries of episodic memories, see Williams et al (2008). 
6 A reviewer wonders if phasic recollection can occur without it being triggered or occasioned by some currently-
perceived structure. My analysis does not preclude this. Rather it identifies a core case (reencounters with artworks) 
and offers a way of spelling out the ontology of those phasic memories that are so occasioned. 
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 “episodic recollection does not strike one as being the kind of event that depends on the 
temporal presence of the object. Indeed, it is arguable that an aspect of the 
phenomenology of such an episode is the current absence of the event recollected” 
(Soteriou 2013, p.90)  
 
In the cases that we are considering, it is the temporal presence of the artwork, here and now, that 
is a salient aspect of the phenomenology of the experience. Call this Presence.  
 
As it happens, Presence is a feature of the phenomenology of perception - it seems to us that we 
are co-located in space and time with the objects and events that we perceptually experience. 
Soteriou links this feature of our perceptual phenomenology to a further claim. Perceptual 
experience is temporally transparent to its objects. Here the idea is that the temporal location of the 
act of perceiving is the same as the temporal location of the objects of one’s experience and this, 
moreover, is phenomenologically salient to us. When we introspectively reflect on our perceptual 
experience, the inception and duration of any episode so reflected on seems to depend on, and 
be determined by, the inception and duration of the events that one is aware of in having the 
experience. In  the case of awareness of a ‘still life’ however, perhaps we can say more. It seems 
that the course of our experience, the way in which we are ‘set in motion’ by the work seems to 
depend, partly, on the form of the work itself. Again, there is no implication that the same work 
reproduces the same experience now as at an earlier time, despite the perceiver being temporally 
transparent to it. Indeed, it is a common experience that works re-encountered after a remote 
interval though temporally transparent to the perceiver are often not experienced as historically 
transparent. This is noted by Patricia Meyer Spacks in her semi-autobiographical Rereading:  
 
“Reading a novel at the time of its publication, we may hardly register how it has been 
shaped by its specific location in time…because we share the author’s historical moment, 
that location may remain largely invisible, as it does in daily life. Reading the same book 
fifteen or twenty years later, we sometimes perceive – often with a sense of shock – that 
it belongs to a bygone era” (2011, p.85). 
 
To modify Spacks’ way of framing things, sometimes re-encounters with artworks can make past 
temporal locations visible to one. It takes an imaginative effort to become aware of 
contingencies of one's present historical situation, though not impossible. These become clearer 
as one recalls them in later times and sometimes re-encounters with artworks can facilitate this - 
you can see the atmosphere of an era at work in the piece.78 This brings into view the second 
respect in which the form of recollection I want to capture differs from episodic memory, 
standardly cast.  
 
2. Time-travel and the transportative phenomenology of phasic memory 
 
Presence foregrounds the thought that part of the phenomenology of the recollective experience 
undergone is its dependence on the artwork now re-encountered. Critically, however, what is 
recalled is often not or only described as episodic, at least on the assumption that episodic 
                                                     
7 Though I do not explore cultural, collective or shared remembering in this paper, there is a clear sense in which 
the concepts of ductus and orientation towards a past phase as I develop it later can be applied to groups. Given that 
artworks are public artefacts designed to be contemplated this should not be surprising. In particular, as a reviewer 
has noted, a clear application to Bradd Shore’s fascinating work on family memory and its mediation is suggested. 
See especially Shore and Kauko (2017).  
8 Thanks to Andy Hamilton for suggesting a way of framing this experience. 
 8 
memory is for recall of one-off episodes (more on that assumption later). For instance, consider 
the passage below:  
 
 “[Re-reading] is time travel, a reliable way to reawaken feelings sparked by a book at first 
 encounter. George MacDonald Fraser's series of Flashman novels summons for me an 
 early stretch at university, when I picked up one in a stranger's room, skimmed a 
 paragraph, and realised with excitement and dread that my set-text reading plan would 
 now implode. Nineteen Eighty-Four brings back a thrilling first sense of professional life 
 and the daily commute, Orwell's novel finished while travelling across town for work 
 experience at 15. Salinger's slim book of stories will forever be a ski-trip coach that 
 smelled not unpleasantly of Chewits; Laughter in the Dark a summer spent dumped and 
 misanthropic and grateful for Nabokov's mean wit.” (Tom Lamont, writing in the 
 Guardian, April 2012). 
 
While the writer refers to one-off episodes – skimming a paragraph, a coach-journey – he also 
refers to phases or intervals: a stretch at university, the daily commute, a summer. But the idiom 
of ‘time travel’ seems to apply as equally to these and it also appears that the recollective 
experience has some kind of transportative phenomenology that applies both to episodes and 
phases. And here what is relevant is not that a work to which one is not now historically 
transparent is re-encountered – Nabokov in particularly might anyway be thought to have a 
temporally transcendent quality - but rather that past episodes and phases in one’s personal history 
are now recalled.  
 
Of course, for some philosophers and psychologists of memory, the use of the phrase ‘time 
travel’ may be taken up as more than idiomatic. Notoriously, Endel Tulving has it that episodic 
memory is that form of memory that makes possible “mental time travel through subjective 
time, from the present to the past, thus allowing one to re-experience, through autonoetic 
awareness, one’s own previous experiences” (2002, p.5). Here ‘autonoetic awareness’ refers to 
conscious awareness that one personally experienced the event now recollected.9 For Tulving 
then, episodic memory involves a kind of mental time travel insofar as it allows for the re-
experiencing of past events personally witnessed. It hence allows for the reliving of those events.  
 
Now, perhaps as far as skimming a paragraph goes, such an analysis might well be granted. But 
with respect to phases, plainly described as part of the phenomenology, it might be wondered: 
how can phases be relived - how can one relive an entire summer, or an early stretch at 
university? The current paper is a part answer to that question but for now, I want only to 
highlight the respect in which Presence interacts with the important fact of the experience being 
occasioned by a re-encounter with an artwork. To do so, I consider the way Soteriou (2013) 
makes sense of the characterisation of recollective experience as involving ‘reliving’.  
 
Soteriou points out that the metaphor of ‘reliving’ might suggest that what is retained in memory 
– and is relived - is an occurrence, something with temporal parts. But this seems problematic. 
Something with duration, something with temporal extension, cannot be retained. So what must 
be retained, he proposes, is a state – knowledge of a past apprehension or “what it was like to 
apprehend the particular event now recollected” (p.173). This ‘know-what’ is not a kind of 
propositional knowledge however, but a special kind of ‘know how’, namely the ability to put 
oneself in an occurrent state of knowledge, the propositional knowledge that this is what it was 
                                                     
9 Malcolm (1963) and Shoemaker (1967) emphasise a distinction between ‘personal’ and ‘factual’ memories. 
‘Personal’ memories, so understood, need not be solely episodic. It is worth noting that for Shoemaker (1976, p.266) 
personal memories are memories of events experienced, but this leaves it open whether one can have personal 
memory of a repeated event. I say a little more about spectrum accounts in fn.13 
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like to undergo that event – a state that obtains in virtue of the phenomenally conscious mental 
episode of recollecting the event which manifests the recaller’s knowledge of what it was like. 
Put more simply, the idea is that episodic memory involves a kind of capacity or ability to put 
oneself into a conscious sensuous state that manifests one’s knowledge of what it was like to 
undergo a past event.  
 
Yet suppose this is granted and suppose that such know-how can be flexibly expressed, as I 
think is plausible,10 this might seem to place a constraint on the possibility of re-encountering an 
artwork in episodic memory. These two claims need to be spelt out. 
 
There are two dimensions along which we can make sense of flexible expression.11 First, the 
ability itself might be something that could be expressed in different ways at different times.  For 
instance, sometimes an external performance might be necessary, as when the production of a 
physical picture is essential to the remembering (for instance, when a police artist assists a 
witness in remembering what a perpetrator looked like). Or we might think of the vehicle – the 
phenomenally conscious episode that manifests one’s knowledge of what it was like - as capable 
of flexible expression. This is because such knowledge is essentially first-personal. So, the vehicle 
need only manifest one’s knowledge of how things truly struck one then - viz. as ‘like’ this; 
different vehicles might manifest and thus be expressive of the same knowledge of ‘what it was 
like’.  
 
Imagine, for instance, that you remember what it was like on some occasion to see your friend 
wearing a striped, colourful skirt. The vehicle that manifests your knowledge of what it was like 
to see your friend then might express that knowledge by representing a skirt of some 
determinate stripyness and colour. But the same knowledge could be expressed at a later time by 
a different phenomenally conscious vehicle. It only struck you that her skirt was ‘colourful’ and 
‘stripy’.  
 
However, suppose now it were possible to re-encounter an artwork through the re-living of past 
personal experience of the work. Surely it would have to be granted that the form of the 
phenomenal vehicle that manifests one’s knowledge of what it was like to encounter that artwork 
ought not to be flexibly expressed. After all, certain aspects of what it is like to listen to Debussy’s 
Clair de Lune ought not to be flexibly expressed if I am to be credited with remembering what the 
piece itself sounds like.12  
 
Now, prima facie, encounters with visual art may seem different in this respect. Debus (2007) 
considers a recollected experience of the seeing of a correctly-positioned Mondrian on a gallery 
wall, and a hypothesised memory of a seeing the same work up-side down. Both experiences 
have as their object the same stripy, colourful formal object, but they have different phenomenal 
vehicles. Might this suggest that recollections with different phenomenal vehicles can, after all, 
manifest knowledge of what a past encounter with an artwork was like?13 Perhaps. But in the 
                                                     
10 Soteriou does not argue for this claim, but I think it is compatible with his ontology and epistemology of mind. 
11 For discussion of how occurrent episodic recollection may be conceived as an expression of knowledge rather 
than a source of knowledge see Hopkins 2018).  
12 As it happens, I think it is implausible to suppose that successively remembering what (aspects of) the symphony 
sounds like could ever be sufficient for a re-encounter with the artwork, leaving aside complicated matters 
concerning the ontology and essential nature of such kinds of musical works, as well as limitations on representation 
in working memory etc. 
13 It is widely accepted that episodes of recollection can take an ‘observer’ rather than a ‘field’ perspective. Sutton 
(2010) characterises such differences in perspective as differences “of form rather than of content:”, suggesting that 
in both cases “the same underlying (complex and distributed) representations can animate occurrent memories 
involving either perspective” (p.33).  
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course of her exposition, Debus draws our attention to a visual analogue of the point made 
above with respect to Debussy and which is, I think, relevant to the difference I am trying to 
explain. 
 
Try to remember an encounter with a painting. Notice that in remembering the painting, typically 
perspectival detail is elided. You might remember what the painting looked like,14 but not what it 
was like to see the painting – where you were standing while looking at it, from which angle it 
was viewed and so on. Debus calls such memory experiences unmediated – they are typically not 
consciously mediated by the memory of seeing the artwork, though the experience might still be 
autonoetic in Tulving’s sense. But if this description is phenomenologically apposite, as I think it 
is, it seems a dilemma is suggested. Why so? For if the recollection of a past personal encounter 
with an artwork can be flexibly expressed, it is not form-preserving. On the other hand, if it is 
unmediated and so is suitably form-preserving, the personal dimension is elided and it is arguably 
no longer apt to be characterised as episodic - viz. as involving a phenomenology that can be 
adequately captured as the reliving of a past personal experience and hence, by Tulving’s lights, 
as constituting a form of mental ‘time travel’.15  
 
To remove the dilemma (if it is real), Presence must be foregrounded. Presence anyway teaches that 
in cases of conscious re-encounter with an artwork in the present, the artwork – and its formal 
features – is there, temporally transparent to the act of perceiving it. There is hence no need to 
reconstruct those features in memory. Since too the experience is one of conscious re-encounter, the 
first-personal dimension remains salient; you are perceptually related to the temporally 
transparent work. But if so - and the work is there, here and now - in what sense can the re-
encounters engender a sense of ‘living anew’ or reliving at all? And how might the re-encounter 
support a transportative phenomenology that pertains not only to episodes but phases?  
 
Soteriou’s proposal, only sketched above, suggests an angle. Part of Soteriou’s argument for 
retained knowledge of acquaintance recognises, in reports of recollection, occasional ellipsis. 
Remembering ‘Mary falling asleep’ can be read propositionally: one remembers that Mary fell 
asleep, or episodically; one remembers seeing Mary falling asleep, where this latter, recall, can be 
glossed as remembering what it was like to see Mary falling asleep. 
 
But, intuitively, a similar line of thinking might be applied to phases. For consider: What the 
writer remembers is what it used to be like to commute in those early days (it felt thrilling) or to 
read Nabokov alone that summer (he was heartbroken). Here the use of a habitual progressive 
aspect might be thought to gesture rather at an existential sense of reliving. That is, the journalist 
remembers what it was like to be him at those earlier phases in his personal history. Call the 
phenomenology of time-travel involved Existential Reliving: one experiences in some renewed way 
what it was like to be oneself at the earlier stage in one’s personal history. What is re-lived is not a 
                                                     
14 For an account of what our knowledge of looks consists in see Martin (2010).  
15 Music psychologist Elizabeth Marguilis links this circle of concepts in a different way by. In her 2014 On Repeat, 
she compares remembering hearing a concert performance with the experience of being beset by a so-called 
‘earworm’, ‘the obstinate unfolding of an imagined line of music’ (p.75): “If I remember a hearing a concert 
performance of Brahm’s Second Symphony, the memory might include something about the hall… the perfume of 
someone in the row behind me…the expressive resonance of the piece. These recollections emerge jumbled 
together, without a clear temporal order…and they emerge in a flash, the memory occupying a duration far shorter 
than the duration occupied by the actual event. But if the second theme gets stuck in my head it is a completely 
different experience – I seem not to remember but rather to rehear the entire thing, note by note, in a clear temporal 
sequence, and over an amount of time that roughly matches the duration its actual performance might have had.” 
Here reliving is associated with precisely the kind of memory that Soteriou found to be ontologically problematic. 
But since occurrences cannot be retained, this suggests that we ought not to think of such reliving as involving the 
retention of a past occurrence after all. It is, rather, as Marguilis urges, a form of sensory imagining.  
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past experience – or even set of experiences – but what it was like to live at that past phase, now. 
I assume (hope) that this characterisation has some phenomenological traction. 
 
It might at once be pointed out however that the ontology of many artworks and the conditions 
of their cultural production and consumption just invites a straightforward appeal to intervals or 
phases and nothing more needs to be said. Novels take time to read; the same overproduced ‘hit’ 
may be ubiquitous for a whole summer before disappearing. But this being so, it is no surprise 
that re-reading and re-listening will then be evocative or prompt recollection of a phase, so 
called.  
 
Of course this is true. Even so, it strikes me that simply noting this fact does not do justice either 
to Presence or to the phenomenology of Existential Reliving, which often seems to be a deeply 
resonant part of the phenomenology. As Bergland comments: 
 
“We all know from life experience that nostalgic songs from your past are like time 
capsules that have the power to take every sense in your body right back to a specific 
time in your life, as if it was yesterday. That rare one hit wonder or random song that you 
haven't heard in decades will instantly unlock a hermetically-sealed memory box and 
transport your mind, body, and brain back in time. All the smells, feelings, friends, 
romantic partners, etc. come rushing back in a tidal wave of vivid memories, as if you were 
there again in the flesh.” (my emphasis, Christopher Bergland, Psychology Today, September 
2016) 
 
The experience is as if there again ‘in the flesh’. 
 
The third consideration I want to raise helps home in on the significance of the descriptive appeal 
to phases, especially with respect to trying to make sense of what the relevant species of time 
travel might involve. 
 
3. Phasic memory and orientation in space 
 
We can grant, I think, that to undergo episodic memory is to be oriented in time. Specifically, it 
involves being oriented with respect to times in time, times which are ordered in time and are 
hence particular. In Past, Space, Self, John Campbell sorts this kind of orientation in time from a 
more primitive form of orientation: orientation with respect to phase. A hibernating animal is 
said to be oriented in this way; it knows when it is late spring, but it may be incapable of 
differentiating one autumn from another - “it simply has no use for the conception of a 
particular autumn, as opposed to the general idea of a season” (p.38).  
 
In his exposition, Campbell can be fairly read I think as opposing orientation with respect to 
particular times to orientation with respect to phase. This latter is a kind of orientation in time 
characteristic of the forms of life of non-human animals while mature human temporal 
orientation is characteristically to particular past times. But might this apparent opposition mask 
a way of being oriented with respect to phase in the human case? I think it does. To see why, 
consider what orientation with respect to phase involves.  
 
A creature that is oriented with respect to a certain phase may be disposed to do certain things 
during that phase. For instance, ‘in Autumn, the red squirrel stores surplus food in gaps in tree 
trunks’. This sentence is an example of what Michael Thompson calls a natural historical 
judgment. The natural historical judgement articulates what the red squirrel does or the form of 
life peculiar to that species. Such judgments are atemporal and non-empirical; they have a so-
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called life-form term in the grammatical subject - the red squirrel. Now, there are plainly ways of 
applying this idea to descriptions of the ‘look’ of the human form of life, though I can’t do that 
in any substantive way in this paper. Still, the rough idea can be sketched. Such descriptions 
would also have life-form terms in the grammatical subject, though qualified now with respect to 
developmental phase – e.g. ‘the human infant tends to put whatever it finds into its mouth’, ‘the 
human adolescent sleeps for 8-10 hours daily’ etc.. And we can imagine qualifications of 
manifold other sorts and of ramifying degrees of specificity - social, cultural, historical and 
epochal. For example, we can conjure descriptions of the ways of filling out space of ‘the 
Victorian householder’, ‘the Sixities Liverpudlian youth’, ‘the Left-Bank flaneur’ etc. But on this 
understanding, notice, orientation in time with respect to phase is in fact a way of being oriented in 
and filling out space. I pick up the relevance of this in §4. 
 
So far, we have sorted orientation with respect to past times and with respect to phases, noting 
that the latter involves a kind of spatial orientation or way of filling out space over time. But 
might there not be a hybrid form of temporal orientation which is a composite of both these 
other forms: namely orientation with respect to particular past phases? If so, then such an 
orientation would seem to involve both the ordering of the past phase in time (like orientation 
with respect to past particular times) while also being such that being oriented with respect to 
that past phase would also involve being oriented in space now but in a way that was characteristic 
of that past phase. It is striking, I think, that much descriptive phenomenology associated with 
re-encountering artworks evinces not only a sense of movement through time (backwards) but 
concomitantly of imaginative re-situation in a distant space. Consider this passage from Marya 
Schechtman, which appears in the course of her expounding her notion of empathic access. Of a 
reformed party-girl, now middle-aged, she writes that: 
 
 “listening to music she once loved may momentarily transport her back to her favourite 
 clubs, and she may even feel a certain wistful nostalgia for those morning commutes to 
 work after a particularly compelling week-night party” (2001, p.101) 
 
The listener finds herself transported while listening to music she once loved now. She is not 
transported to one specific site however, but to the ‘lay of the land’ as it was for her then as we 
might put it. Figuratively, we might say that the present moment becomes a moment in a remote 
phase in her life, itself characterised by a way of filling out space (those morning commutes). In 
this way, the present sub-region of space that she now occupies – there is music in her 
perceptual ambit and she is listening to it – may itself be experienced, again speaking figuratively, 
as a subregion of that distant space, which is thereby somehow made chiasmatically present (to 
coin a phrase).16  
 
This passage does not yet fully paint the idea of one’s being oriented in space now with respect 
to a past phase but it does, I think, at least draw attention to the spatiality of the relevant 
memory. And this, I hope, is sufficiently convincing for now. It also helps introduce a final point 
which makes way for the positive thesis I detail in §3.  
 
It is intuitive to think that the reformed party-girl’s nostalgia is part of the experience of her re-
encounter. But if the experience involved the mere reproduction of an earlier experience or 
earlier set of experiences, the experience of nostalgia would have to ‘fall outwith’ whatever it is 
we would choose to thereby circumscribe as the experience. Nostalgia was not part of the original 
                                                     
16 See Soteriou (2018) for an allied view. The paper is obviously indebted to Soteriou’s work – especially his 2013 
book – in various ways. 
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experience presumably, on this view, now reproduced.17  I pick up this thread of thinking a little 
later.  
 
§3. The Positive Thesis 
 
I have now gestured at three respects in which episodic and phasic memory as occasioned by re-
encountering artworks differ. As a caveat, it is worth saying that I am marking this distinction for 
dialectical purposes. It may turn out (as I suspect) that the episodic/phasic distinction is less 
relevant than the difference that the presence of a formal object makes to the occurrence of 
particular phasic memories.18  
 
To recap, these differences were broadly as follows: In episodic memory, the events recollected 
are absent; what is recalled is typically a one-off event that occurred in the past, an event which 
one personally witnessed, and which it might be supposed is in some sense relived through the 
conscious sensuous phenomenology that characterises the episode of recall; the event is known 
to be past and is experienced as ordered in time. In contrast, in recall as occasioned by re-
encounters with artworks, the artwork is present; what is recalled is often a past phase in one’s 
personal history and there is a phenomenological sense in which one relives what it was like to 
be oneself during that phase. And in being oriented with respect to a past particular phase, the 
recall may also orient one with respect to a past space now (though I do not claim this 
phenomenology is pervasive – whether it is so, seems to be an unexplored empirical matter). 
 
In the rest of the paper I develop my positive claim. The idea that episodes of phasic memory 
constitutively depend on the formal character of the temporally transparent artwork. In §1, I said 
something about the nature of this form. I suggested that ‘still lives’ are those that can ground 
phasic recollection and I proposed that such works have a peculiar power or ductus that is 
grounded in their form. Such works are both re-encounterable and have the power to direct 
thought, feeling, imagination and perception. All going well then, encountering such works 
should satisfy Murdoch’s Constraint.  But first I raise a candidate objection to the idea sketched so 
far by considering a context, already hinted at, in which the notion of phasic recollection already 
has a natural home - Marya Schechtman’s notion of ‘empathic access’. I attendantly highlight 
ways in which the phenomenon I isolate is richer than an alternative explanation might allow: the 
suggestion that what we have here remains a case of episodic memory, but that what is 
recollected is only a generic episode with particularity, as I will put it, bleached out, or at least made 
diffuse.  
 
                                                     
17 While this might be considered just as true for episodic as for phasic memories, it is tempting to surmise that 
nostalgia pertains largely to phasic and not episodic recollections, though this is an empirical supposition that I 
cannot explore here. At any rate, as I hope to show, it strikes me that the question as to the scope of the experience 
helps motivate reflection on its metaphysical structure, the task of the remaining part of the paper. 
18 That this is so suggests that the episodic/phasic distinction could well be treated as something of a spectrum with 
the crucial difference in kind pertaining to whether Presence obtains or not in either case. Such an approach could be 
fruitfully brought into contact with number of studies that seek to locate continuities rather than cleavages between 
putative memory kinds – for instance, Rowlands (2017) explores treating the episodic/semantic distinction as 
continuous; Neisser’s 1981 notion of repisodic memory is memory not for one-off events but a repeated series; 
Renoult et al’s recent account of personal semantic memory also allows for a continuum reading on which personal 
semantic memory is intermediate between episodic and general semantic memory. For dialectical reasons, I think it 
is useful to keep them apart in this paper. The question of whether what we have here are genuine psychological 
kinds strikes me as a bit premature. At the same time, the descriptive phenomenology does invite such a distinction, 
though there are important individuative questions nearby – for instance, if the two are to be distinguished what is 
the relation between them? As noted earlier, I leave this question aside. 
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As noted, Schechtman’s conception of ‘empathic access’ chimes with the datum I have so far 
been assembling through snippets of testimony. In cases of recollection as occasioned by re-
encounters with artworks, the artwork is there, and the experience is temporally transparent to the 
artwork (Presence). Often what is recollected are not one-off episodes, but seasons or past 
intervals. Accordingly, it is not (merely) the case that specific episodes are recalled and 
sensuously relived. Rather, one in some sense re-lives what it used to be like to be oneself at the 
earlier phase (Existential Reliving), where this appears to involve a spatial dimension, something 
which reflection on Schechtman’s notion of ‘empathic access’ will help bring out. So, what does 
‘empathic access’ involve? 
 
According to Schechtman (2001) ‘empathic access’ – or some complex psychological construct 
that answers to that description – is a psychological feature that is overlooked in neo-Lockean 
psychological continuity accounts of personal identity.19  On those accounts so long as a there is 
a sufficient number of appropriately caused psychological connections between some set of 
psychological states that a person or ‘time-slice’ of a person could be ‘in’ from one moment to 
the next – often states of recollection - the person is the same.20 In contrast, Schechtman 
emphasises a ‘point of view’, where what is at stake in disavowals of the person being the same is 
“the loss of a particular kind of access to one’s past point of view” (p.19); and where, when such 
access is lost, an individual can in some sense “no longer remember what it was like to be as they 
were before” (my emphasis p.20). What kind of ‘access’ does she have in mind?   
 “[I]individuals [that lack such access] may be able to tell you well enough what they did 
and said and thought and felt in their ‘previous lives’, but they are no longer capable of 
inhabiting the first-person point of view that they once inhabited. They cannot feel as 
they felt before or look at the world through the same eyes…[there is] an inability to 
inhabit the first-person perspective of the earlier person in a gestalt phenomenological 
sense. It is no longer possible to see the world as one once saw it or to feel about things 
the way one once felt.” (pp.20-21).  
For my purposes and, intriguingly, two central descriptive features of Schechtman’s account line 
up with the position so far sketched in this paper. First, the species of remembering that 
Schechtman appeals to is plainly phasic. She writes that empathic access requires “that a person 
retain some sympathy for the psychological features of the life phase to which she retains access” 
(p.109), and that “remembering a past life-phase seems essential to being the same person who 
experienced that phase” (pp.102). Second, though not a theoretical feature of her account, she 
recognises that such access is often occasioned by re-encountering ‘still lives’, something I 
flagged up earlier with the case of the reformed party girl. Keeping these points in mind, I now 
want to consider a candidate challenge which I extrapolate from a reading of a 2014 paper by 
Christoph Hoerl. Shortly, I will bring Hoerl into conversation with Schechtman. 
Hoerl takes up the datum that Debus (2007) also isolates, and which I mentioned earlier with her 
conception of unmediated recollection. Unlike Debus, however, Hoerl proposes that such 
experience should count as a distinct species of recollection –  memory for what x looks like. 
                                                     
19 She also criticises narrative accounts for a like neglect. Note her concern is not with metaphysical or literal identity 
and survival but figurative identity, though, as she notes, for the neo-Lockean this amounts to roughly the same 
thing. For a distinctive criticism see Hamilton (2013), particularly Chs 2 and 3. 
20 Of course, it can happen that we ‘change our mind’, modify behaviours, acquire new beliefs and so on. In such 
cases, we might be inclined to say that we have changed, and even say things like ‘I no longer recognise that person’. 
For the neo-Lockean, despite such testimony, so long was the psychological binds from one moment to the next are 
appropriately yoked together, the same person survives. 
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Here is the case he sketches (notably, again, the art status of the recollected object is not a 
conceptual feature of his proposal): 
MONA LISA 
During a spell living in Paris, I used to visit the Louvre to admire the Mona Lisa. In 
casting my mind back to those occasions “I have a genuine episodic memory, even 
though my memory may not single out one of these visits amongst others by some 
unique feature. The phenomenology…..is [nonetheless] the same as that involved in 
recollecting a one-off event” (p.358).  
 
Now, while for Hoerl the phenomenology of the experience conjured up in so casting his mind 
back is said to be “the same” as recollecting a one-off event, he also acknowledges that there is 
in fact very little to distinguish his seeing the Mona Lisa from remembering what the Mona Lisa looks 
like. What marks the latter off from the former is autobiographical knowledge that he had spent 
the relevant spell living in Paris followed by periods of living elsewhere. But this knowledge, he 
says, “can provide for a way of making concrete to myself a sense in which what I remember 
when I recall those visits is something that will not occur again” (p.38). That is, it can be drawn 
upon in making concrete that the current experience is past insofar as it “mobilizes causal 
reasoning” about which events superseded which others in one’s life. Accordingly, while he 
acknowledges a causal connection between, in this case, past episodes of apprehension and 
current experience, he denies that a mere causal connection between such states could ever be 
sufficient either to individuate the experience as one of recollection or to single out one particular 
past event. Besides, as he explains, visual imaginings are also casually related to past encounters21; 
our imaginings draw on our past perceptions and are thereby also suitably causally related to 
those past encounters. What makes the experience a memory, however, is the fact that it is 
constellated in a wider pattern of autobiographical knowledge and what makes it episodic is the 
first-personal recognition of its pastness, due to this wider pattern, and this despite its generic 
character.  
 
Hoerl’s case is demanding, I think, since it suggests that appeal to phasic recollection, indeed that 
very designation, may just be superfluous – episodic memory can be construed as broad enough 
to make sense of phasic recollection, provided episodic memories are generic memories that are 
appropriately bound up with autobiographical knowledge. However, my concern – something 
that my title reflects - is with such recollection as occasioned by re-encountering artworks and it should 
be plain that such experiences do differ.22 The phenomenology is not the same as that of 
recollecting a one-off event or repeated series of events that is past; this is since the re-encounter 
is taking place now, and so does not involve appreciation that the experience is not something 
that will not occur again. Yet nor is it the case that what is remembered is what the artwork 
looked like or sounded like, a form of recollection which might seem to elide the first-personal 
dimension entirely. Instead, the first-personal dimension of the experience remains intact – 
indeed it is highly salient, as the wistful nostalgia of Schechtman’s reformed party-goer illustrates 
and reminds us. At the same time, for Schechtman, the first-personal dimension is far richer than 
that could be afforded by autobiographical knowledge, even when such knowledge is suitably 
integrated with generic sensory-perceptual episodes. And broadly, this is since the first-personal 
dimension is understood in terms of a point of view and not merely in terms of subjective sensory 
episodes which, though they may have perspectival content, only acquire first-personal content 
through their being integrated with autobiographical knowledge. I develop the import of this 
                                                     
21 For related discussion see Martin (2015, pp. 33-43) 
22 There is no reason to think Hoerl would disagree.  
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conception of a point of view, as I see it, in the next section. But with this end in mind, two 
features of Schechtman’s treatment are worth foregrounding now. 
 
Schechtman emphasises the plenitudinous character of the recollective experiences that she 
thinks empathic access involves. Such experiences are plenitidinous since they involve not just 
perceptual access to a generic past episode, but access to past feelings, patterns of thought and 
affect. What ‘empathic access’ enables is that such past feelings - and objectives inherent in past 
patterns of motivation over an interval - can be given weight in present deliberation now about 
future action.23 The relevant ‘access’ then is not a wholly backward-looking phenomenon. How 
plenitudinous must the experience be? Well, submits Schechtman, we can hardly demand of the 
reformed party-goer that she recollect - 
“the thoughts, feelings and emotions of the entire decade of the party girl’s wild days – 
this is too many inner states to maintain even dispositionally. What is needed instead is a 
more modest connection to that era, together with enough empathic access to enable 
sympathetic phenomenological and behavioural representation of that era in the present” 
(my emphasis, 2001, p.110) 
 
Call what Schechtman requires a Present Connection. There needs to be a connection to the past phase 
in the present. 
The second feature of her account worth highlighting is as follows: a failure of empathic access 
does not appear to involve a failure of autobiographical memory at all, for such individuals “may 
be able to tell you well enough what they did and said and thought and felt in their “previous 
lives”. Rather it involves an inability to occupy or inhabit “the first-person point of view that 
they once inhabited”. What does this mean?  
 
Schechtman doesn’t say explicitly, but let us pick up a previous line of thinking. Earlier, I 
characterised the notion of a phase by appeal to different ways of filling out space and time. On 
this view, we might count among past personal phases those delimitated by the duration of, for 
instance, a romantic relationship, a job, a particular school, living in a certain neighbourhood and 
so on. And we might suppose all of these phases to be associated with (and partly individuated 
by) distinct nexi of relations of places and people of interest and concern. But on this 
understanding, an ability to occupy or inhabit ‘the first-person point of view once inhabited’ 
might be an ability to orient oneself with respect to those distinct nexi – and not merely in 
thought, and imagination, but in the space now currently occupies. This was just the notion 
introduced earlier of orientation with respect to particular past phase. 
 
It might well be wondered how this is possible, an empirical question surely. At the same time, it 
strikes me that the art status of the artefact re-encountered is not at all irrelevant, though it 
remains untheorized. This is because the nexi of relations of places and people of interest and 
concern that are characteristic of phases typically involve artworks - works or types of work with 
which one repetitively engaged with over the phase, either by happenstance or deliberatively. 
And many such works may even have been self-defining, particularly at an early age.24 Such 
artefacts are what I have called ‘still lives’ – while being associated with a phase they may 
transcend it, if not historically then in the sense that they can move through space and time, in 
tact. And this confers on them a particular explanatory and mnemonic status. 
                                                     
23 Sutton (2010) also notes that one can have affective and kinaesthetic access to past perspectives.   
24 I think there is good reason to assume that Schechtman is implicitly thinking in these spatial and material terms, 
though I cannot give full elaboration or defence of this interpretation here. See instead Schechtman’s development 
of the PLV (person life view) in her 2014 Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns and the Unity of a Life. 
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It could be objected that madeleines might well have been repetitively encountered insofar as 
they were frequently eaten. But they do not have the same status. Madeleines are not self-
defining. Generally, they are not baked to be contemplated, or to reward aesthetic attention, 
even if they could be. There is something special about ‘still lives’. In the next section I make 
plain what. 
§4. Form and the Present Connection 
 
In the last section, I suggested that the kind of recollection occasioned by re-encountering 
artworks is not best thought of as memory for what the work of art sounded or looked like. This 
would anyway imply the current absence of the work, pace Presence. Further, the fact that the 
descriptive phenomenology points to Existential Reliving suggests that the first-personal 
dimension cannot be accommodated by autobiographical memory alone – the experience is, as it 
were, ‘in the flesh’. At the same time, the phenomenon typically involves affective temporal 
emotions like nostalgia, something I have not said much about. I can now be brief:  
 
On an account where what is remembered is a generic episodic memory, feelings like nostalgia 
are not strictly part of the experience since they were not part of the particular experiences now 
bundled together and generically recalled. In contrast, on the positive account I now assemble 
there is no requirement at all that such feelings be conceived as ‘outwith’ the recollective 
experience as a whole. This is because rather than involving a generic memory of a set of past particular 
encounters, the particular present re-encounter, which involves a historical individual standing in a 
perceptual relation to a temporally transparent ‘still life’, is generic to a particular past phase or interval, 
namely the interval or phase over which the work was previously repetitively engaged with. But if 
so, one’s current perceptual relation to the temporally transparent artwork can play the role of 
the Present Connection Schechtman envisages. I say a bit more about the nature of this Present 
Connection in the case of ‘still lives’ below. First a clarificatory point.  
 
I introduced Schechtman’s idiom of ‘inhabitation’ above to help elucidate what a point of view 
is. It is  “a way of being in, and interacting with, the world” (ibid. p.23) where having access to a 
past point of view - being able to inhabit that past point of view - is to have access to the 
patterns of feeling, thought and objectives contained in motivations characteristic of that past 
phase. This is Schechtman’s way of putting things and it chimes with Proust’s characterisation of 
Swann’s suite of recollections on re-encountering Vinteuil’s sonata. He recalls “all the network of 
mental habits, of seasonable impressions, of sensory reactions, which had extended over a series 
of weeks its uniform meshes, by which his body now found itself inextricably held” (Proust 
(1913/1956), Swann's Way, p. 496). But I have also gestured towards more literal reading, 
specifically through the notion of being oriented with respect to phase, and specifically to a past 
particular phase. Since inhabiting a past point of view is not merely experiential but is tied to 
potential modes of acting, inhabiting a past point of view in the present can be said to be a way 
of being oriented in space now, albeit in a way that was characteristic of that past phase. I take it 
that this is a familiar, if under-theorised phenomenon (at least in analytic philosophy) – crossing 
the threshold of a childhood home or revisiting an old haunt can sometimes occasion, even 
tempt, old ways of filling out space now, old patterns of behaviour. Homes and haunts are places 
that can be filled or moved through. Artworks typically can’t, or are not supposed to be (there 
are exceptions). So, in what respect might past ways of filling out space be made available simply 
on re-encountering an artwork in the present? Hopefully by now I have assembled enough 
conceptual material to begin spelling out why. 
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The artwork and its perceptually accessible form is there – this is Presence. I have stipulated that 
works that induce phasic recollection are those that have a ductus, a power to conduct patterns of 
perception, thought, imagination and feeling. In re-encountering an artwork, one is confronted 
anew with this power. To this extent, one comes to be in the same condition as one was then 
now, though it is not the case that the same experience is reproduced.  Rather, in virtue of their 
re-encounterable form, such works are apt to partially determine ways in which a perceptual 
relation to them is maintained and sustained over time (this among other things).  
 
However, because the artwork now re-encountered once had a place in a nexus of places and 
people of interest and concern – ‘the lie of the land’ as it was for one then - in being related to 
the artwork now, it seems one can spontaneously find oneself oriented with respect to that past 
space. And this seems particularly so of works of personal value – the song the reformed party-
girl once loved, the consolation offered by Nabokov – although it seems that works that 
appeared in one’s live at a phase by happenstance, simply by virtue of one’s living through time 
at a certain place, can also have this effect. And in either case, I suppose it is an empirical matter 
as to why. Such exploration would likely be subpersonal,25 but I am concerned rather with the 
phenomenology (which must surely be elucidated in step with, if not prior to, any such 
subpersonal enquiry) as well as with what I take to be a plausible metaphysical treatment of the 
experience. And, as I hope is now clear, the fact of the re-encounter being with a formal object 
that was intentionally designed to be contemplated is crucial. I can now be explicit. 
 
Phasic recollection seems to be a form of memory which Debus (2007) characterizes, though 
without theorizing, as constitutive. This is memory that is “composed of memorial and perceptual 
experiential elements” (p.193), where certain spatial aspects of the perceptual experience are 
constitutively part of the memory. It strikes me that the artwork and its formal features play this 
constitutive role in the case of phasic recollection, at least on re-encountering still lives.26 How 
so? 
 
If what I have argued is on the right track, in being perceptually related to the work – in being 
‘face-to-face with it’ (or the equivalent in the auditory case) - one is in the same condition now as 
one was at any earlier phase, namely the phase over which one previously repetitively engaged 
with the work, though there is no assumption that the same experience is reproduced. Rather the 
                                                     
25 The hippocampus is known to play a role in route learning and spatial or topographical memory as well as in 
episodic memory, where episodic memory is understood to involve the encoding of where and when a particular 
event, say, (what) occurred (Hartley 2014). For Eichenbaum (2017) however, though both space and time are 
processed in the hippocampus, they are represented by distinct neural network patterns. What and where need not, it 
seems, be wedded to a particular when. This invites a suggestion: supposing that the same what can occur in the same 
broad spatial region though at many different places (wheres) in that nexus and/or at many different specific whens 
over a remote interval, it is tempting to suppose that the specificity of the particular wheres constituting the nexus, as 
well as the particular whens of past engagement, can become transparent to the overall way that places are 
constellated over some interval. Tantalisingly, Tavares et al (2015) argues that hippocampal neuronal populations 
can also code ‘social space’ – networks of affiliation. In the case we are considering, the what is the perceptual event 
of an encounter with an artwork. If that event takes place repetitively over an interval and perhaps too at different 
places over that interval, a later re-encounter may prompt memories not specifically of particular past encounters, or 
particular places where encounters took place, though these may, of course, be recollected, but the region itself over 
an interval – a past constellation of ‘wheres’, linked partly perhaps by filaments of personal value. 
26 Colombetti (2017) develops a position on moods which has parallels with the current proposal. Moods are not 
merely influenced by events and situations but are ‘scaffolded’ and interrelated with the world in complex ways, 
even to the extent that they can ‘experientially incorporate parts of the world’.  She also explores ways in which 
moods can be regulated by artefacts that can be sought out to rekindle memories or stabilise self-identity. Listening 
to music is identified as one such world-involving, mood-scaffolding regulatory activity. Of course such self-
regulatory activity in the case of music involves re-listening. While often phasic memory occurs unbidden, it can also 
be sought out through active relistening to work that has long been retired. Indeed, this activity formed a happy part 
of the research for this paper! See also Krueger (2014). 
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current particular encounter is generic to a past phase. But to this extent, there is at least 
potential for one’s inhabitation of a past point of view; the particular artwork and one’s 
perceptual relation to it to provides the Present Connection. Importantly, this connection is not 
causal. It involves the subject’s conscious active awareness of a work of art, the ductus of which, 
grounded in perceptually accessible form, partly determines the way in which attention to it is 
sustained and modified over time. And this explains the existential dimension of Existential 
Reliving,. One’s current experience – the experience one is currently living through – is generic to 
past phase. Naturally, the intentional status of the artwork plays a role here which standard 
madeleines cannot. ‘Still lives’ are designed to be contemplated and to reward attention. Their 
normative status further facilitates disinterested engagement, which is sustained over time. But 
this makes possible too a certain reflective awareness of the recollection occasioned. Such 
reflective awareness and any associated feelings – nostalgia, for instance – need not be conceived 
as falling outwith the experience, however. This is since, once a relationalist metaphysics of 
perception is in place, the experience can be understood to involve a historical subject standing in 
a perceptual relation to an artwork.  
 
Granted, spelling all of this out adequately requires another paper, perhaps more than one, as 
does, relatedly, making fully explicit the explanatory role that a relationist metaphysics of 
perception plays in the current account (as well as the relation of ductus and form). Since I can’t 
do that here, I close by setting out the spectral analogy that I think partly reflects this peculiar 
metaphysics and by saying something about the significance of this metaphysics for the mental 
time travel debate. 
When one looks in the direction of a mirror in the same space in which one is, one can see 
regions behind one.27 In the course of the paper, I have tried sketching an analogous position 
with respect to re-encountering ‘still lives’. In re-encountering certain kinds of artworks now – at 
the same time at which one is - past intervals or phases in one’s personal history can seem to be made 
present. In Proust’s phrase, Vinteuil’s sonata reflects a season of love; the past is reflected through 
one’s current perceptual engagement with the powerful still-life, a work which once had a place 
in a past nexus of places and people of interest and concern; the ‘lay of the land’ as it was for one 
then. At the same time, since one’s engagement with artwork is typically disinterested one can 
reflect, and even dwell upon, the feelings and thoughts engendered in one by and through one’s 
engagement. But it is for this reason hat our manner of relating to the work can sometimes also 
become the matter of our reflection – a mirror not only of a past phase, but of ourselves. 
 
So, to close, what lessons does the phasic recollection as occasioned by reencountering artworks 
have for theorists – philosophers and psychologists – of mental time travel?  
 
I think it is plain that the phenomenon I am theorizing cross-cuts the debate between continuists 
and discontinuists with respect to imagination and memory. Imagery is part of phasic 
recollection (and their episodic components) – both sensuous (the smell of chewits, the curled 
petals of Odette’s chrysanthemums) and motor (the network of habits by which Swann’s body is 
held) – but imagery, it seems, is not fundamental. Strikingly, if phasic recollection is partly 
constituted by spatial or formal structure that is perceptually experienced, and the presence of that 
structure is necessary to its being occasioned and perhaps even being sustained, then perhaps 
phasic memory cannot occur in the absence of the subject’s being perceptually related to that 
temporally transparent structure.28  
 
                                                     
27 See Steenhagen (2017) for interesting discussion. 
28 See fn. 3 
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I have explored a phenomenon which without doubt does involve the phenomenology of 
temporal transportation, figuratively cast by one writer as ‘time travel’. But, as I hope to have 
shown, this phenomenology is not best characterized in terms of recollection of a past event 
personally witnessed and now relived. My use of the word ‘existential’ is supposed to gesture 
rather at the respect in which the phenomenology of transportation ramifies beyond past time 
and place. It is not just a matter of the experiencer being ‘taken back’ to a distant time and place, 
as though the historical subject now undergoing the recall is the same as the previous witness. 
Instead, through the present encounter, the historical subject experiences or recalls, 
momentarily, what it was like to be herself at an earlier stage in her personal history. If anything, 
then, a difference between past and present selves – here I am speaking intuitively not theoretically 
- is made salient. But where remembering is effectively only imagining the past, it is not clear 
where this difference in the historical subject can be put. 
 
Finally, as is perhaps dimly visible by now, if phasic recollection as I have cast it  involves a 
mode of temporal orientation that has a spatial dimension that is configured by networks of 
earlier interests and concerns, however those nexi are to be empirically understood, there is a 
sense in which, as Schechtman wants to urge, it can be Janus-headed and have a future 
orientation too - and her reformed party girl can see the world, briefly, through unreformed eyes, 
and act on it too, unreformed. This suggests not only the transportative but the transformative 
power of art, and in this case of the temporally transparent still-life, when re-encountered.2930 
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